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Security Information

NSC BRIEFING NOTES

9 JULY 1953

SOVIET UNION

(1) Soviet still pressing for Korean armistice -

Vishinsky tells Bohlen there must be one - curious

editorial in Izvestia - mentions Stalin 11 times -

obviously written by the Malenkov school of thought -

as particularly refers to Stalin-Malenkov organized

party congress of last October - refers to leader who

neglect to cultivate revolutionary theory as unworthy

and one whom "^{life}~~Lightning~~ will sooner or later strike ^{him}

^{list}
off the ~~hours~~."

(2) Where is Beria?

(3) FBI finds that Soviet agents in U. S. have stopped
espionage and overt collection of information.

(4) Tito deeply impressed by developments in Satellites particularly Hungarian relaxation policy and is quoted as saying, while does not believe in any basic change in Soviet policy they are suffering from accumulation of pressures resulting from weaknesses and mistakes of part and must make great changes, "These changes are real and not just tactical maneuvering and not yet ended."

EAST GERMANY AND EAST BERLIN

(SUMMARY OF ON THE SPOT REPORT)

(1) 16th June uprising began with small labor demonstrations which winked at by authorities but quickly joined on mass scale by workers.

(2) East German police intervention ineffective. They obviously distrusted by Soviet whose quick military intervention kept situation from getting out of hand.

(3) But potentially revolutionary situation develops based on:

(a) Hatred of regime and local government.

(b) Attempt increase work norms.

(c) Food shortage and lack of consumers goods.

(d) Conciliatory measures ^{of Soviet} taken by population as evidence

that reprisals would not be too severe.

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(e) Demonstrations outside of Berlin followed similar pattern and showed good discipline and experienced leadership. These demonstrations followed quickly on East Berlin strike, ~~was~~ declaration of workers solidarity - strikes, marches against Communist party strongholds.

(4) Trade union movement played vital role.

(5) East German developments show possibility of revolt from below even in Communist police state and since "revolt of masses type" find Soviet particularly vulnerable ^{and} - emphasizes [^] reactionary character of Communism and real role of Red Army.

(6) East German riots cause Soviet to review its entire East German policy, shows up unreliability of East German troops and reduces usefulness of East Germany as pawn in its overall German policy.

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(7) Propaganda call for German unity which Soviet hastily preparing would now be considered evidence of weakness and Soviet may have to delay giving West opportunity for initiative.

(8) SED (Communist Party in East Germany) and its leadership thoroughly discredited.

(1) Press reports of demonstrations in other satellite areas largely exaggerated particularly reports of unrest in Poland.

(2) However Soviet continues its relaxation policy in certain satellites particularly Hungary where reorganization based on Soviet pattern initiated.

(3) One man Rakosi rule ended and apparently committee form of government instituted.

(4) New Hungarian regime promises. Large reversal farm collectivization and slow down industrialization - abolition of internment camp - rise in living standards.

(5) Czech government repeals stringent decree combatting absenteeism.

(6) In Albania peasants agricultural debts cancelled.

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X. Latest developments in East Germany

A. Sit down strikes reported in Berlin on 7 July

1. Spread through various plants and projects in Berlin
and into the East Zone

B. East German Government denied reports of strikes, but announced two conciliatory measures:

1. Release of majority of those arrested in 17 July riots
2. Opening of sector borders

C. Release of imprisoned workers was reported goal of strikers; has now apparently been accomplished

D. Western observers speculate on opening of sector borders that:

1. The measure was taken in anticipation of further disorders for which the West will be blamed
2. The action is designed to create an atmosphere favorable to unity talks.

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CHICOMS OFF-SHORE ISLAND CAMPAIGN

- (1) ChiCom military forces costal area including elements from Korea have seized total of 13 Nationalists held off-shore islands since 29 May.
- (2) Pattern of operation suggest general mopping-up to eventually include 2 main islands -- Tachen and Chinmen.
- (3) Chicoms have 180,000 men available in 2 costal provinces and capture of islands depends on naval transportation and support available.
- (4) Chicoms have 420,000 men and several MIG 15 units in East China.
- (5) Total Nationalists and Nationalists guerrillas on off-shore islands approximately over 60,000 with some 50,000 on Chinmen alone.
- (6) Question of evacuation U.S. personnel working with guerrillas (9 including 2 officers on Tachen).